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Review Essay
The State of “Sorry”: Official Apologies and their
Absence
ALICE MACLACHLAN
The Age of Apology: Facing Up to the Past by Mark Gibney, Rhoda E. Howard-Hassman,
Jean-Marc Coicaud, and Niklaus Steiner, Editors. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2008. 344 pp. $26.50, paperback.
The Politics of Official Apologies by Melissa Nobles. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2008. 214 pp. $24.99, paperback.
Resentment’s Virtue: Jean Ame´ry and the Refusal to Forgive by Thomas Brudholm. Philadel-
phia: Temple University Press, 2008. 256 pp. $24.95, paperback.
The late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have been called the age of apol-
ogy by a number of academics and political figures. Exact numbers vary, but even at a
conservative estimate, there have been over 50 official apologies offered by heads of state,
government representatives, as well as the leaders of churches, corporations, and other non-
governmental organizations in the last several decades.1 And the list of actual apologies is
of course much shorter than the list of individuals and groups who have demanded apology
during the same period, but whose demands have thus far been denied or ignored: infa-
mous examples of non-apologies include the Turkish government’s refusal to apologize for
the Armenian genocide of 1915, and the American government’s refusal to apologize for
slavery.2 Apologies and their absence have emerged and remained in focus within broader
efforts to respond morally and politically to historical injustices, postcolonial legacies, and
authoritarian rule, as well as the atrocities of genocide, crimes against humanity, and the
violence of civil and ethnic conflict.
Despite this phenomenon, the academic literature on apologies has only just begun
to catch up to the literature on various other aspects of repair following serious wrong:
forgiveness, reconciliation, amnesty, and pardons. Prior to 2008, there were only a hand-
ful of book-length treatments, most notably by sociologist Nicolas Tavuchis (1991) and
psychologist Aaron Lazare (2004). Philosopher and legal scholar Nick Smith was able
to open his 2008 monograph, I Was Wrong: The Meaning of Apologies, with the bold, if
entirely plausible, claim that his was the only philosophical monograph dedicated solely
to the topic of apologies since Maimonides’ Hilchot Teshuvah, circa 1170. Moreover, the
interdisciplinary volume The Age of Apology (Gibney et al. 2008) discussed in this essay
is, to my knowledge, the first of its kind.
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The dearth of books on apologies is particularly striking if we consider that only the
apology, from among the concepts listed above, makes its primary demand of the perpetrator
and not the victim of wrongdoing. The call for an official apology, and thus for a change in
the authoritative historical record, can be read as an important continuation of the policy of
“speaking truth to power,” originating in Quaker communities and taken up by the human
rights and civil rights activists in the twentieth century. At the same time, many observers
are cynical of the new politics of apology, dismissing it as cheap, “gestural politics” awash
in self-interest and crocodile tears, which enable governments and leaders to defuse angry
minority groups without committing any actual resources to the problems of injustice and
exclusion (Cunningham 2004).
Neither the optimism nor the cynicism surrounding apologies appear entirely mis-
placed: In one recent example, the Australian government officially apologized to Aus-
tralian Aboriginal peoples for a history of government policies that included the forcible
removal of “half-caste” Aboriginal children from their families, for the purposes of saving
and “whitening” them. This was a hard-won victory for Aboriginal peoples and their allies,
as the previous Liberal government, led by Prime Minister John Howard, had refused to
endorse what Howard called a “black armband view of history” for almost a decade, even in
the face of widespread public support for an official apology and grassroots movements like
national “Sorry Day” and the signing of “Sorry” books. Yet, while Labour Prime Minister
Kevin Rudd acknowledged in his speech the “the indignity, the degradation, and the humil-
iation these laws embodied” and the “families and communities whose lives were ripped
apart by the actions of successive governments under successive parliaments,” there was
no compensation package for victims and their families attached to the much-publicized
apology (Rudd 2008). What commitments the apology did make toward improving the ma-
terial conditions of life for Australia’s Aboriginal peoples were left vague and ultimately
fell short of those recommendations made by the Bringing Them Home report, which had
initiated the drive for apology ten years earlier.3
How then can theorists and observers best make sense of the sudden proliferation of
apologies on the political stage? Given the solemn weight of history apologies seem to
carry, and the passion with which victimized groups demand them, subjecting apologies to
critical analysis can feel inappropriate, even blasphemous. At the same time, there remains
significant confusion over what, exactly a particular apology is meant to achieve or offer,
and by what standards we ought to evaluate it. Given the kinds of serious and longstanding
wrongs for which state actors and public figures are called upon to apologize, what—if
anything—could possibly qualify as a good or satisfying apology? What is it exactly
that a public apology is meant to do or accomplish? Apologies—as well as the needs,
rights, attitudes, and responses of victims that lead to demands for apologies—require
contextualization and thematization. This task is taken up, in various ways, by the three
books discussed in this essay.
The essays collected in The Age of Apology explore the emerging practice of public
apologies by primarily Western nations from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. The aim
of the collection, its editors explain, is not only to account for the rapid proliferation of public
apologies over the last 20 years but to situate the rise of the public apology thematically:
connecting it to postcolonial relationships between former colonizers and the colonized,
to the rise of social movements like the civil rights movement, and indigenous people’s
demands for sovereignty, and to difficult questions of collective and intergenerational
responsibility for past wrongs.
The Age of Apology consists of 20 individual essays, divided into five sections. The first
section addresses the meaning of apologies from the perspective of contemporary legal,
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political, and ethical theory, with some cross-cultural comparison. The remaining sections
present, collectively, a typology of public apologies: They cover, in turn, “internal” state
apologies—that is, government apologies to minority groups in their own population,
international apologies between states, and apologies by nonstate actors (papal apologies
and corporate apologies). The final two essays address “the war on terror” as an apparent
exception to all categories; a decision that itself is suggestive of the limits to any such
typology.4 The cases chosen to illustrate these different types of public apology range
geographically and historically: from the Treaty of Waitangi settlement process between
New Zealand’s government and the indigenous Maori people, to the German minister for
economic cooperation and development’s apology for atrocities committed in the former
German South-West Africa (Namibia), to “quasi-apologies” by the Canadian government,
and a perceived lack of apology by Japan to its South Asian neighbors, most notably China
and Korea, for atrocities committed during the Second World War.
Because of its interdisciplinary and its collective nature, The Age of Apology can use-
fully be seen as a representative example of the present state of academic literature on
apology. Several features are worth noting—first and foremost, the wide view taken of
what constitutes a public apology. Contributors to the volume consider apologies by corpo-
rations, church leaders, and the media, as well as those by heads of state or governments.
This inclusive approach is exemplary of the literature as a whole, which has developed
increasingly complex and inclusive criteria for mapping apologies.5 Theorists are no longer
satisfied to mark off apologies as collective or interpersonal but focus also on the kind of
authority the apologizer is taken to have (whether representative, ceremonial, corporate,
or celebrity), on the nature and the historical location of the wrong (discrete or ongoing;
in the recent or distant past) and on the identity of the individual or group demanding an
apology in the first place (whether primary victims, their political representatives, or indeed
their descendents). The authority, the content, and the addressee of a given apology are
understood to be crucial in locating both its meaning and its purpose; as these elements
vary, so does the import of the apology.
Equally exemplary of the broader literature is the lack of consensus over what actually
constitutes an apology, official or otherwise. Commentators disagree over the extent to
which apologies are “mere” speech and should be assessed as such or, rather, if a genuine
apology includes other meaningful actions (for example, reparation or compensation).
Theorists of apology have tended to understand them in terms of speech-act theory, drawing
on the work of British philosopher J. L. Austin (1975) and concluding that they “can only
be done with words and, by corollary, if [they] are not done in the words, [they] have not
been done” (Bavelas 2004: 1). But it is not clear that apologies are always done in words,
or at least, not the same words each time; this is particularly true in the public realm, where
“apologies can be communicated in a wide range of ways, through verbal statements issued
publicly, joint declarations, legislative resolutions, documents and reports, legal judgments,
pardon ceremonies, apology rituals, days of observance, reconciliation walks, monuments
and memorials, even names bestowed on the landscape” (Weyeneth 2001: 20). Furthermore,
the notion of speech act does not yet convey the extent to which apologies may be ritualistic
and ceremonial. Sanderijn Cels argues that we should focus less on apologies as speech and
more on apologies as performances, drawing on the resources of dramaturgical theory to
interpret their ceremonial significance.6 Nick Smith also includes performance among the
elements of what he calls a “categorical apology”: the regulative ideal guiding our various
practices of apologizing—both in public and in private, individually and collectively (Smith
2008: 74).
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The difficulty of categorizing apologies as speech emerges at various points in the
volume. While most contributors rely on standard speech-act definitions of apology, some
challenge it; and one of the editors, Mark Gibney, has argued in previous works for two
nonvocal performative elements, “publicity” and “ceremony,” as crucial criteria for an
authentic public apology (Gibney and Rockstrom 2001). Furthermore, the tendentious
relationship between speech and action arises in Carlos Parodi’s piece on “State Apologies
Under U.S. Hegemony.” Parodi considers how US political influence in Latin America has
complicated local efforts to come to terms with past human rights violations. It would be
too easy, he notes, to assume that Latin American truth commissions are mere tools of US
power and interests in the region, but he concludes that until the United States is included
in these processes as a responsible actor, apparently benevolent gestures such as President
Clinton’s 1999 apology for American support of repressive military forces in Guatemala
will have little lasting effect on the region. Apologies do not count as such without the
support of transformative actions.
Similarly, Rhoda Howard-Hassmann and Anthony Lombardo’s empirical research on
the reception of Western apologies by educated Africans (“Words Require Action: Africa
Elite Opinion About Apologies from the ‘West”’) notes a remarkable level of consensus
among those they interviewed: “without actions, they believed, words are meaningless”
(Gibney et al. 2008: 218). Since apologies are at least partly normative—that is, part of
what makes something an apology is the author’s intention to accomplish something of
moral value—the line between whether action is required for something to be a good
apology or for something to even be an apology tends to blur. Meaningless, empty, or failed
apologies may not merely be bad apologies, they may fail to be apologies at all.
There is also significant dispute over the extent to which tone and sincerity should affect
our evaluation of a political apology. The wrong tone or obvious insincerity can undermine
the import of an apology but can the right tone guarantee it? J. L. Austin assigned apologies
to the class of behabitives; statements or utterances that are concerned with attitudes and
feelings (Austin 1975: 83). But feelings and attitudes are clearly not the only things with
which apologies concern themselves. In fact, most apologies perform multiple functions.
First, they have a narrative function: Apologies identify the wrongdoing as such, the
apologizer as responsible for it, and the victim or addressee as wrongfully harmed by
it. Second, apologies communicate disavowal; in apologizing, the wrongdoer distances
oneself from her acts even as she takes responsibility for them, repudiating the attitudes,
motivations, and circumstances that led her to perform them. Finally, apologies represent a
form of commitment, both to the apologizer’s ongoing disavowal and her good-faith efforts
to repair the wrongs as she is able and as is appropriate. Feelings and attitudes only appear
as the vehicles for these primary functions. At least in our interpersonal relationships to
others, we achieve disavowal and distance from past actions through our attitudes towards
them. These attitudes are what motivate our commitment to be different or better.
Difficulties thus arise in the public, political realm, where personal feelings and atti-
tudes do not (and perhaps should not) play the same motivational role. Theorists of political
apology have struggled to provide appropriate motivational measures that might form the
basis for evaluating “good” and “bad” public apologies, but they disagree over whether
this is to be found in attached material compensation, changes to the historical record,
the affective responses of addressees and witnesses, or in terms of a renegotiated political
relationship between apologizer and addressee (or indeed, in all of the above). To treat
the first, material compensation, as a standard seems to render the apology itself almost
irrelevant, and the second, historical record, does not seem to depend on tone or mood but
could also, presumably, be accomplished by acts other than an apology. Yet the third is
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hard to quantify, or even comprehend. The debate remains at an impasse, and the editors
of this collection remark—and rightly so—that, for the present, political apologies must be
viewed with a mixture of hope and unease (Gibney et al. 2008: 8).
Several contributors to The Age of Apology correctly emphasize that academic analysis
of public apologies has not yet matured; that is, there is little consensus—or, as of yet, even
structured debate—over the meanings, features, or desiderata of public apologies. This can
leave the observer with the vague sense that theorists of public apologies are talking past
one another. If this volume has one serious shortcoming, it is that it does little to correct
this impression. So, for example, Renteln’s cross-cultural analysis of apologies notes that
the idea of apologies as necessarily “sincere, heartfelt or voluntary” may be more localized
than many have recognized, and that apologies may serve different purposes in societies
with norms organized around shame as opposed to guilt (Gibney et al. 2008: 68–69). Yet,
in the very next essay (Jean-Marc Coicaud and Jibecke Jo¨nsson, “Elements of a Road Map
for a Politics of Apology”) the authors start from the—presumed universal—premise that
“for the offering of apology to have a real value, it is essential that the remorse conveyed is
genuine” (78). Further conversation among contributors might also have served to connect
the theoretical discussions of apologies in Part I to the cases and examples illustrated in
subsequent chapters. Instead, it seemed as if each contributor was required to offer his
or her own introductory framework. Indeed, this was not always a bad thing, as some
later discussions of the political and legal theory of apologies were more insightful than
the opening chapters. But the overall impression was one of inconsistency and sometimes
incommensurability, rather than dialogue and engagement.7
The complexity described in the pages of The Age of Apology (and toward which
I have tried to gesture, above) demonstrates that there is not yet a conclusive method for
understanding all instances of public apologies. Perhaps we do better, then, when we refrain
from asking, “What is the meaning of the public apology?” where the question is taken to be
general, applying to all contexts and instances. Instead we might ask, “What is the meaning
of this particular apology, or these apologies, in this context and in these circumstances?”
Melissa Nobles takes up the second, more focused task in her book titled The Politics of
Official Apologies.
The Politics of Official Apologies offers a “membership theory of official apologies,”
based on an analysis of five specific contexts in which the demand for apology has been
made: the plight of indigenous peoples in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United
States, as well as that of African Americans. The membership theory of apologies that
Nobles advocates is based on the following claim. While individual political actors may
have various individual reasons and motivations for pursuing a course of official apology,
ultimately, such apologies function as part of ongoing efforts to reshape the terms of
membership in a national political community, where membership is taken to have legal,
political, and affective dimensions. We can assess the merits and the success of particular
apologies, she argues, based on their responsiveness to and their effects on these three
dimensions of the relationship between the minority in question and the larger political
community (Nobles 2008: 36–37). Study of the five cases in question reveals how official
apologies have, on occasion, been able to play this political role.
Apologies are capable of performing the moral and political task of renegotiating
membership, Nobles claims, because they officially acknowledge historic injustices and
thus create grounds for rectification, the reshaping of political arrangements, and other
policy changes. The effects of apologies on the affective dimensions of membership, she
notes, are far less predictable: Public reaction to even the mention of apology can (and
does) vary widely from country to country, with a majority of Canadians tending to support
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government apologies, for example, while in the United States, the suggestion can raise
substantial backlash and anger (Nobles 2008: 138). Apologies differ from other responses
to wrongdoing, such as reparations, in that they are symbolic and do not offer financial or
material relief, but Nobles is right to point out that they ought to be evaluated on their own
terms and not dismissed as materially useless (143–144). The difficulty, as noted above, is
determining what exactly those terms are: Nobles’ strategy is to show the concrete effects
of at least some apologies to draw out some more general aspects of their significance and
function.
The comparative examples Nobles employs are well chosen for their similarities; be-
cause all four countries are settler societies and former British colonies, the dominant
(though not homogeneous) Anglo-European culture in all four ensures some degree of cul-
tural convergence regarding the nature, meaning, and propriety of apologies.8 Furthermore,
in all cases the demand for apology arises on behalf of a small minority of the population and
is rooted in grave historical injustices—the seizure of land, cultural colonialism and appro-
priation, illegitimate subjection to the state, violent and forcible removal, and slavery—as
well as an ongoing history of formal and material inequality. Yet the differences between
these cases are also telling: The demands of indigenous peoples tend to focus on three
aspects: land claims, self-government, and cultural preservation. The demands of African
Americans are somewhat different and—as Nobles notes—are concerned less “with the
goals of formal equality than with their nonachievement and limits” (2008: 19).
Furthermore, there are significant disanalogies between the history of indigenous peo-
ples in settler societies and that of African Americans. Nobles is careful to acknowledge
these disanalogies explicitly and their consequences for her analysis (African Americans
get short shrift in the book’s middle chapters) noting that “African American-related apolo-
gies (and nonapologies) are not among the book’s main cases” (2008: 39), but the result is
that the intended scope of her analysis is unclear: That is, whether the membership apology
is meant to apply to all cases of government apologies to oppressed internal minorities or
only to indigenous peoples as a special case. The membership theory of apologies—with its
focus on the legal and political dimensions of membership as well as affective, subjective
relationships—seems particularly compelling in the case of indigenous peoples, whose le-
gal and political status has been especially complex, ranging historically from state “wards”
to asymmetrical notions of “registered Indian” or “citizens plus” (Nobles 2008: 44–46) and
which is still in debate today.9 I am not sure it would apply as cleanly to all cases of
historical injustice, especially when the demand is for recognition and acknowledgment of
a discrete past wrong, made by citizens whose current legal and political status is relatively
unproblematic, such as Ukrainian Canadians seeking apology for internment during World
War I, or Japanese Canadians and Americans seeking apology for internment during World
War II.
The middle chapters of The Politics of Official Apologies provide detailed, nuanced
yet accessible histories of the indigenous peoples of all four countries. Nobles outlines the
many individual factors, players, circumstances, and events that resulted in demands for
apology in some cases and not others, and that led to offers of apology in some cases and
not others. Her book is a valuable resource for anyone looking to know the details of these
political histories. The historical specificity of Nobles’ account renders it vulnerable as well
as impressive, however, and, in particular, her analysis suffers from some rather unlucky
timing. In 2008, the year of her book’s publication, our understanding of at least two of
the central cases she presents changed dramatically. As I mentioned above, on February 13
of that year, newly elected Australian PM Kevin Rudd offered the apology to Australia’s
indigenous peoples that his predecessor, John Howard, had so strongly resisted (and whose
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resistance is the focus of much of Nobles’ analysis of the Australian case, rendering many
of her conclusions about potential Australian reception to such an apology premature).
The second case is perhaps of greater concern. On June 8, 2008, Canadian Prime
Minister Stephen Harper also offered an apology to Canada’s indigenous peoples for the
government’s complicity in the Indian Residential Schools, following years of campaigning
and lobbying by indigenous activists, international pressure, and—ultimately—a successful
lawsuit (Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement 2006). Once again, it is simply
unfortunate that Nobles’ book publication preceded such a relevant event and thus she
could not subject it to her analysis. In this case, however, the misfortune is compounded
by Nobles’ claim that the Canadian government had already uttered an official apology to
its indigenous peoples for these government policies. At various points, Nobles takes the
“Statement of Reconciliation” issued in 1998 by Jane Stewart, then (Liberal) Minister for
Indian and Northern Affairs, to be an official government apology (2008: 116).
Whether or not Nobles is right to treat Stewart’s Statement of Reconciliation as an
official act of apology is a difficult question, and one that gets at the heart of the confusion
surrounding the nature and purpose of political apologies. That is, it raises the issue of
standards by which an event even counts as an apology—let alone a good or successful
one. A closer look at the text of the statement is instructive in this matter. Nowhere in
Stewart’s statement, for example, does she use the word “apology” or “apologize.” She
indicates that Canada must “recognize” and “acknowledge” the effects of its history on its
indigenous peoples, and she formally expresses “regret” at the actions of past governments,
but that regret is never transformed into the admittedly stronger terms of “responsibility,”
“remorse,” or even “guilt.” The statement executes a graceful dance of equivocation, telling
the survivors of residential schools that “we wish to emphasize that what you experienced
was not your fault and should never have happened”; a remark that—in this context—is
almost patronizing and does not go on to locate fault elsewhere. While the statement does
go on to say “to those of you who suffered this tragedy at residential schools, we are deeply
sorry,” but “sorry” in this context is highly ambivalent (and, it appears, intentionally so);
it could express remorse, but, equally, it could be merely sympathetic.10 Most alarming,
perhaps, is the line that introduces the issue: “Sadly, our history with respect to the treatment
of Aboriginal people is not something in which we can take pride.” The emphasis is self-
directed, albeit critical; it does not reach out to the purported addressee.11
Also significant is the broader context of the 1998 statement: It was not uttered by
Prime Minister Jean Chretien, then the leader of the Canadian government. Indeed, he did
not attend the ceremony, though he was in Ottawa at the time. This contrasts starkly with
the 2008 apology, uttered by the Canadian Prime Minister in the Canadian parliament,
followed by statements from leaders of all political parties and—most importantly—by a
response from Chief Phil Fontaine of the Assembly of First Nations (the political body
representing over 50 native tribes) in full ceremonial headdress, alongside leaders from
Canada’s Me´tis and Inuit populations. This was the first time indigenous leaders had been
invited onto the floor of the house in their capacity as representatives of nations and had
been granted permission to speak in that capacity.12 The evidence that this was an act of
apology, and—moreover—an official one, is overwhelming.
Nobles never comments on the ambiguous title of Stewart’s statement, or the absence
of words and phrases we typically take to signal the functions of apology. Relying primarily
on media accounts from that time, which noted broad public acceptance that the government
had indeed “apologized,” she treats it as a surprisingly unproblematic example and subjects
the statement to less scrutiny than is warranted. Here Nobles might fruitfully enter into
conversation with Matt James, one contributor to The Age of Apology (“Wrestling with
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the Past: Apologies, Quasi-Apologies, and Non-Apologies in Canada”). James argues that
the novelty and ambiguity surrounding the so-called “politics of apology”—and the lack
of a properly political set of criteria for evaluating them—have allowed various levels of
Canadian government to represent themselves as more apologetic than is warranted. He
differentiates apparent cases into apologies, quasi-apologies, and non-apologies, noting
how a preponderance of the latter two has led Canadian observers to overestimate their
nation’s commitment to redressing the past. What emerges is the sense that determining
the nature of a “true” or “genuine” apology is not merely speculative conceptual analysis
but may have concrete implications for the politics of apology on the ground.
Nobles is not necessarily wrong in her appraisal and James right in his: There are
grounds for arguing that insofar as those involved take a statement to be an apology, it
can reasonably be read as such. There is some evidence that the Canadian government
intended the statement to be apologetic, or at least sufficiently apologetic, and—as Nobles
cites—mainstream media sources were quick to name it so. But on the other hand, response
by indigenous leaders and activists was mixed, as was the historical record over time. It is
hardly coincidental that in the text of his official response to the 2008 government apology,
Chief Phil Fontaine leaves one, rather emphatic, phrase to stand alone, without qualifier:
“Finally, we have heard Canada say it is sorry” (2008).
The case of the 1998 Canadian Statement would have been an excellent opportunity for
a discussion of apology criteria: Are these internal to the text or to the performance? Should
they be determined situationally or more broadly? To what extent are they descriptive, or
do they include normative aspects (the extent to which the apparent apology is able to
achieve its moral and political function, for example)? As noted by Weyeneth (2001)
above, apologies have taken any number of forms. Moreover, there are reasons to avoid
highly determinate, strict criteria, insofar as these might fail to represent actual practices
and instances of apologizing, but Nobles does not invoke these.13
Of course, the apologetic or non-apologetic nature of Stewart’s statement might well
have remained a matter of interpretive speculation, had the Canadian government not
offered an unambiguous apology covering much of the same history, several months after
the release of Nobles’ book. Furthermore, in offering a “theory” of apologies, Nobles is
not engaging in conceptual analysis but political explanation: why people seek them, the
conditions under which governments offer them, and what they provide to the broader
political venture of responding to past injustice. Indeed, her account as a whole focuses
more on analyzing the concept of political membership—that is, its meaning, dimensions
and expression as revealed in the histories of four former British colonies —than she
does on the concept of apology, or, for that matter, the qualifier “official.” As a result,
these concepts remain undertheorized, at times to the detriment of her book’s main claims.
But this lack of analysis does not undermine what I take to be a unique strength of the
book: that is, the clear, detailed, and consistently engaging comparative histories of the
indigenous peoples of four countries, and the careful detailing of the complex variables
involved in their ongoing struggles for recognition and political change, as these make up
the bulk of the middle chapters. This book is perhaps most useful to scholars of indigenous
rights and indigenous histories, and not to scholars of apologies, but that is no insignificant
achievement.
The interpretive difficulties faced by Nobles and others in determining just when an
apology has taken place raise interesting questions about the relevance of non-apologies
in assessing the politics of apology. As the case with the 1998 Canadian Statement of
Reconciliation, we can learn a great deal about what a well-timed apology might have
meant or accomplished, by studying those instances in which one was not offered, or in
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which what has been offered should not qualify as an apology proper. Non-apologies or
quasi-apologies teach us about the potential moral and political work of apologies, by
showing us—sometimes viscerally—where and how they are unsatisfying. Nobles herself
notes that the long list of apologies offered or demanded is dwarfed next to the almost
“incalculable” number of instances in which apologies could be appropriately offered but
are either refused or not demanded (5). What is left for the victims of wrongdoing, when
no satisfying apology is made—or indeed, when no satisfying or sufficient apology could
ever be made?
One way to read Thomas Brudholm’s text, Resentment’s Virtue: Jean Ame´ry and the
Refusal to Forgive, is as an extended meditation on the dangers of moving too quickly from
the questions of apology, responsibility, and acknowledgment of wrongdoing, to issues of
forgiveness, resolution, and reconciliation—or even, of assuming too quickly that the move
must be made. Brudholm’s purpose, he writes, is to “provid[e] a constructive complement
to writings that dismiss various kinds of resentment and refusals to forgive only as the
negative to be overcome” (Brudholm 2008: 171). He aims both to rehabilitate resentment
as a potentially moral response to serious wrongdoing, and to caution against what he
takes to be the overenthusiastic, and at times careless, promotion of forgiveness in recent
writings on transitional justice. Of course these two aims are not unconnected; Brudholm
sees the current promotion forgiveness as a catch all for responding to moral and political
wrongdoing taking place at the expense of legitimate expressions of anger, resentment,
and other morally laden reactive attitudes. Insofar as forgiveness is glorified, anger is
necessarily condemned. This zero-sum game approach is, for Brudholm, exemplified in
the workings—and in subsequent analyses—of the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC).
Brudholm’s approach to his topic is somewhat unconventional. The book divides in two
parts, which are divided in their focus, their content, and their historical era. The first half of
Resentment’s Virtue is a sustained critique of the TRC and, in particular, the subtle and less
subtle ways in which Archbishop Desmond Tutu praised, promoted and encouraged victims
who forgave, at times to the point of emotional manipulation. Resentful victims were not
actually coerced into forgiveness, of course, and forgiveness was not part of the official
mandate of the TRC. All the same, Brudholm demonstrates, resistance to forgiveness was
interpreted as temporary, unfortunate (both for them and for society), or even pathologized
as a burden they must eventually remove. What emerged was a normative “discourse of
reconciliation” (Verdoolaege 2006).
Yet however miraculous the push for harmony and reconciliation at all costs might
have been at minimizing the violence and instability in the South African transition from
apartheid, it sits in tension with the recognition that transition from evil is not resolvable
without “moral remainder,” in the words of Claudia Card; that is, that “imbalances, debts, or
unexpiated wrongs . . . remain even after we have done what can be done to put things right”
(Card 2002: 169). Drawing on transcripts, media reports, narratives by victims, and Tutu’s
own autobiographical account of the TRC, Brudholm gives a compelling and convincing
critique of what he himself acknowledges was nevertheless a powerful phenomenon. He
concludes at the end of Part I that an excessive focus on forgiveness actually shuts down our
ability to acknowledge and respond appropriately to the moral remainders of evil, violence,
and serious wrongdoing. It also does significant, perhaps irreparable, damage to victims
engaging morally—and viscerally—with the same. Someone wishing to quibble with Brud-
holm’s assessment of forgiveness as a moral concept might note that Tutu’s understanding
is not universal, or even dominant, in philosophical and psychological discussions of the
topic. There are other approaches to forgiveness that lessen its silencing or coercive effects
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on resentful victims.14 But his critique of the TRC—and his wider point about promoting
forgiveness in political contexts—is extremely well taken.
In Part II, Brudholm shifts from the operations of the South African TRC of the 1990s,
to the writings of Jean Ame´ry, a Jewish Holocaust survivor in postwar Germany. It is here
that he hopes to reveal the virtue of resentment, or ressentiment, as expressed in Ame´ry’s
essays. Brudholm intends the sudden shift in history, geography, and focus to be jarring,
as is the move from public transcripts to personal essays, and the supposedly “backwards”
shift from forgiveness to resentment—in this, he is successful.
He is less successful, perhaps, in connecting his discussion of Ame´ry to the wider
project of the book. It is not clear what relationship Brudholm sees between the functioning
of the TRC and the experiences of Ame´ry; one is a public discourse and the other a
set of private reflections. Is the latter a straightforward [if anachronistic] rebuke to the
former, or does it hint at some constructive alternative? How might the insights of Ame´ry
be applied to the mechanisms of transitional justice, beyond the vague caution that the
responses and experiences of victims must be attended to? He cites Ame´ry as stressing that
“the book is not a documentary work, but rather an examination or a phenomenological
description of the existence of the victim” (Brudholm 2008: 69). The reader is left to convert
phenomenological description into the “virtue” promised in the title. What emerges is some
sense that resentment can play a central role in an ongoing effort to manage and understand
the past, to resist the message and values of wrongdoing, and to find morally appropriate
ways to relate to others (both perpetrators, bystanders, and other victims). It’s not clear that
this demonstrates a virtue of resentment, but it certainly demonstrates its potential value,
and Brudholm is right that this insight is missing from the pages of Tutu’s reflections on the
TRC. But, as Brudholm himself acknowledges (2008: 168–169), the insight is not absent
from current debates about resentment and forgiveness: Indeed, it is addressed in the work
of R. Jay Wallace (1994), Margaret Walker (2006), Charles Griswold (2007), and others.
Thus, his intended audience is unclear.
Apologies are not the central focus of Brudholm’s book, but it is interesting, for our
purposes, to consider how they might fit into his analysis—or indeed, what his insights
about the moral features of resentment reveal about the value of apologies. Ultimately,
argues Brudholm following Ame´ry, “a kind of reconciliation between peoples can build on
a common refusal of reconciliation with the past” (2008: 116). This resonates nicely with
the functions of apology I described above: namely, narrative, disavowal, and commitment.
Apologies are not only official records and acknowledgments of past wrongdoings (and
government responsibility thereof) but they can also function of authoritative condemna-
tions of the same. As such, they can contribute to a “common refusal of reconciliation”
with past wrongs on behalf of those who once perpetrated and endorsed them, or those
who now represent or inherit the mantle of the perpetrators. Brudholm has demonstrated
how responsibility for reconciliation and for the difficult business of “managing the past”
can fall, unfairly and asymmetrically, on the shoulders of victims. In the 2008 apology for
Canada’s residential schools, PM Harper states:
The burden of this experience has been on your shoulders for far too long. The
burden is properly ours as a Government and as a country. There is no place in
Canada for the attitudes that inspired the Indian Residential Schools system to
ever again prevail. You have been working on recovering from this experience
for a long time and in a very real sense, we are now joining you on this journey.
(Harper 2008)
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As theorists of apology continue to navigate how we might best identify, understand
and critique the sudden plethora of political apologies on the global stage, understanding
the power of official narrative, disavowal, and condemnation to shift responsibility to where
it belongs is perhaps an excellent place to start.
Notes
1. See, for example, Nobles (2008)—discussed in detail below—as well as Smith (2008) and Oliner
(2008). Janna Thompson refers to an epidemic of apology in a slightly earlier work, whose focus
is more broadly on efforts to respond to historical injustices (Thompson 1992).
2. In the former case, the refusal is more extreme than in the latter; the Turkish government refuses
to acknowledge that any genocide occurred. Such acknowledgement (i.e., that a genocide against
the Armenian people did occur and that the Turkish government is culpable for it) is a necessary
condition for apology, since, among other tasks, apologies perform a narrative function: They
identify the story of wrongdoing as such. See my discussion of Austin on p. [376] for further
discussion. In the US example, no one will deny that slavery occurred, but few are willing to
accept a level of responsibility that would entail financial liability or reparations.
3. The texts of the apology and the report are both available online. See Rudd (2008) and “Bringing
Them Home” (1997).
4. Or, on the other hand, the decision may also reveal the exceptionalism with which North American
academics continue to approach the phenomenon of the War on Terror, in general. The two essays
on the topic do not convince me that the War on Terror resists the kind of analysis offered for
other forms of internal state or international apologies, or that it is the only phenomenon to
transcend the boundaries between the two.
5. Nicholas Tavuchis originally provided a standard typology of apologies: distinguishing between
interpersonal or One-to-One apologies, and One-to-Many, Many-to-One, and Many-to-Many
(Tavuchis, 1991: 48). Melissa Nobles distinguishes between apologies offered by: (1) heads of
state and government officials, (2) governments, (3) religious institutions, (4) organized groups
and individual citizens, (5) nongovernmental organizations and institutions, and (6) private
institutions (Nobles 2008: 4).
6. This point is taken from personal correspondence with Cels regarding her ongoing research. For
more information on her work in progress, see Cels (2010).
7. Admittedly, the mechanics of edited volumes rarely allow for extensive coordination between
individual contributors. Thus I take these inconsistencies to be understandable, even expected,
given the current state of the literature, and not indicative of particular editorial failings. But the
wider lack of engagement between individual theorists is lamentable.
8. As one contributor to The Age of Apology notes, apologies may look like—and mean—very
different things in different parts of the world (Alison Dundes Renteln, “Apologies: A Cross-
Cultural Analysis”). Another contributor, Elizabeth Dahl, draws out ways in which practices of
giving and receiving apologies are gendered as well as culturally situated apologize (Elizabeth
Dahl, “Is Japan Facing Its Past? The Case of Japan and its Neighbors”).
9. For example, in Canada, there are still issues arising from the gendered nature of registered Indian
status. According to the Indian Act, an Indian woman who married a white man would lose her
Indian status, as would her children, even if she remained on the reservation (the same was not
true for an Indian man who married a white woman). This was not changed until Bill C-31 in
1985, and its consequences are still being felt by the now-adult children of indigenous women
and non-indigenous men, today. In fact, a bill to rectify the differential treatment of indigenous
women and indigenous men was introduced by the Canadian government on March 11, 2010. If
passed, this bill would effectively render a further 45,000 Canadians eligible for Indian Status.
See “New Law to Extend Indian Status to Thousands” (2010).
10. Many official statements of regret, or indeed, reconciliation, will stop short of responsibility and
thus apology, in order to avoid incurring financial liability. See Macduff (2009).
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11. Stewart, Jane, Honourable, Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs, “Statement of Reconciliation
on behalf of Canada’s Government to Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples,” January 7, 1998.
12. The contrast I emphasize between the 1998 and 2008 statements should not be read as an
unqualified endorsement of the latter as a good apology. Indeed, there remain serious points
of concern in the wording of the 2008 apology and the policies surrounding it. Nevertheless,
as far as determining what qualifies as an official apology (imperfect or otherwise) goes, this
example is fairly unambiguous, as indicated in the following sentence: “Therefore, on behalf of
the Government of Canada and all Canadians, I stand before you, in this Chamber so central to our
life as a country, to apologize to Aboriginal peoples for Canada’s role in the Indian Residential
Schools system.” PM Harper goes on to say, “[T]he Government of Canada sincerely apologizes
and asks the forgiveness of the Aboriginal peoples of this country for failing them so profoundly”
(Harper 2008). www.fns.bc.ca/pdf/TextofApology.pdf (Accessed March 18, 2009).
13. I have argued elsewhere that our approach to understanding practices of moral repair such as
forgiveness and apology should be plural and particularistic, focusing in part on how individual
instances are understood and interpreted by those involved (MacLachlan 2009).
14. See Griswold (2007), Norlock (2009), and MacLachlan (2009).
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